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U.S.C. § 505: Does it Allow the
Bankruptcy Court to Determine a
Third Party's Tax Liability?

11

[The court may determine the amount or legality of any

tax, any fine or penalty relating to a tax.*
INTRODUCTION

The scope of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction has been a
controversial issue among the courts.' The plain language of 11

U.S.C. section 505(a)(1) 2 allows the bankruptcy court to determine "the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or penalty
relating to a tax, or any addition to tax." ' 3 It is this language

that has given rise to judicial interpretations ranging from a
broad grant of jurisdiction over any tax, including that of a
third party, 4 to the narrow conclusion that section 505(a)(1) only

applies to the debtor or the debtor's estate.5
The controversy arising from the language of section 505 is
whether the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is broad enough to
I1U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
For a comprehensive discussion of the bankruptcy court's junsdiction in general,
see L.T. Ruth Coal Co., Inc. v. Big Sandy Coal & Coke Co., Inc., 66 B.R. 753 (Bankr.
E.D. Ky. 1986).
2 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 505(a)(1) provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of tis subsection, the court may
determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or penalty relating
to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not previously assessed, whether
or not paid, and whether or not contested before and adjudicated by a
judicial or admimstrative tribunal of competent junsdiction.
*

3 Id.

4 Jon Co., Inc. v. United States, 30 B.R. 831 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (the
bankruptcy court has § 505(a)(1) jurisdiction to determine the legality of a 100% penalty
against corporate officers, even if it would not be assessed against the debtor).
United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 46 B.R. 741 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985) (the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court does not extend to the separate liabilities of taxpayers
who are not debtors), aff'd, 783 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986).
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encompass the obligations of third parties. 6 The issue of the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over third parties was first considered in In re MajorDynamics, Inc. ,7 which raised the question
in the context of third-party unsecured creditors. The court
found that the "jurisdictional grant of § 505 is not, by its terms,
limited to a determination of [the] tax liability of the debtor "8
Therefore, the court held that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to determine disputes between third-party creditors and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 9 It is on the basis of this
ruling that the courts have differed as to the proper interpretation of section 505(a)(1).
Although the issue of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction
over third parties has arisen in a variety of contexts, 0 it has
most frequently been considered in the context of a 26 U.S.C.
section 667211 tax penalty The section 6672 penalty arises when
a corporate officer or other responsible party fails to see that
the corporate debtor's taxes are paid. 12 Section 6672 allows the
IRS to assess a penalty against the corporate officer or respon-

6 In this Comment, "third party" or "third party nondebtor" refers to corporate
officers unless otherwise indicated. The courts have used "third party" and "third party
nondebtor" to refer to a creditor's committee, a spouse of a Chapter 13 debtor, a
financer of employee payrolls, as well as corporate officers. See In re Brandt-Airflex
Corp., 843 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (financer of employee payroll); Pressimore v. IRS,
39 B.R. 240 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1984) (spouse); In re H & R Ice Co., Inc., 24 B.R. 28
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982) (corporate officer); In re Major Dynamics, Inc., 14 B.R. 969
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981) (creditor's committee).
7 14 B.R. 969 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981) (The Official Creditors' Committee, comprised of investors in the debtor company, filed a motion for a temporary stay of IRS
audits of the creditors based on the argument that the audits threatened to hopelessly
fractionalize the unsecured creditors.).
8 Id. at 971.
9Id. at 972. (Although the court found that it had jurisdiction, it did not grant
the temporary injunction because there was no proof that an audit of the unsecured
creditors would adversely affect the debtor's reorganization efforts.).
10 See, e.g., Pressimone, 39 B.R. 240 (the third party is the spouse in a Chapter
13 proceeding); H & R Ice Co., Inc., 24 B.R. 28 (the third party is a corporate officer);
Major Dynamics, Inc., 14 B.R. 969 (the third party is an Official Creditors' Committee).
" 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 6672(a) provides in part:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any
tax imposed by this title who willfully falls to collect such tax, or truthfully
account for and pay over such tax,
shall,
be liable to a penalty
equal to the total amount of the tax evaded or not collected, or not
accounted for and paid over.
12 Id.
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sible party for the full amount of the corporate debtor's unpaid
taxes.' 3 Therefore, in a section 6672 case, the jurisdiction question that may arise is whether the bankruptcy court has subject
matter jurisdiction to determine the legality and collection of a
corporate officer's 100% tax penalty within the corporate debtor's Chapter 11 proceeding.
This Comment presents an analysis of the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction over third parties in the context of a section 6672
tax penalty against corporate officers. Part I gives the legislative
history of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction prior to the enactment of 11 U.S.C. section 505(a)(1). 14 Part II presents an objective overview of the arguments for and against junsdiction over
third parties. 15 The arguments include: consideration of legislative intent, 16 the scope of the jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C.
section 1471,'1 the impact of a section 6672 penalty on corporate
reorganization, 8 and the effect of the anti-mjunction act19 on
the bankruptcy court's ability to enjoin the IRS. 20 Part III presents possible solutions to the jurisdictional problem presented in
this Comment. 2' Finally, this Comment concludes that jurisdiction over third parties should be permitted in cases where corporate reorganization is affected."
Id.
,, See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 32-96 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
17 See mnfra notes 43-64 and accompanying text.
," See mnfra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
,9 See mfra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
- In addition, the courts have also considered the issues of standing and sovereign
immunity. However, an in-depth analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Comment. The sovereign immunity argument is based on the question of whether the
United States has waived its sovereign immunity based on 11 U.S.C. § 106. Section 106
states: "A governmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect
to any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate and that arose
out of the same transaction or occurrence out of which such governmental unit's claim
arose."
The question of standing arises because the debtor corporation is seeking to litigate
the liability of its corporate officers. The test for standing is "whether the plaintiff has
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his
invocation of federal-court junsdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial
powers on is behalf." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38
(1976) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)) (emphasis in onginal).
21 See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
13
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S
JURISDICTION

The first grant of power to the bankruptcy court to determine
a tax question was contained in section 64a of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.23 Section 64a stated that, "in case any question
arises as to the amount or legality of any such tax, the same
shall be heard and determined by the court." The purpose of
this provision was to provide a forum for the ready determination of the legality or amount of tax claims, which if left to
other proceedings might delay adminstration of the bankruptcy
estate.2
In 1966, subsection (2A) was added to the 1898 Act 26 which
empowered the bankruptcy court to "[h]ear and deternmne, or
cause to be heard and determined, any question arising as to the
amount or legality of any unpaid tax." 27 This section was enacted "to clarify the power of the bankruptcy court in the area
of tax evauation."
Section 505 of Title 11,29 enacted in 1978, was derived from
the former Bankruptcy Act.30 Section 505 authorized the court
to determine, "the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or
penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax."' 31 This broad
language of section 505, which allows the bankruptcy court to
determine the legality of any tax, has created the controversy
concerning the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over disputes between third party nondebtors and the IRS.

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 64(a), 30 Stat. 563 (1898) (codified as
amended m scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
2 Id.

3 CoLIEaR ON BANKRUTicY
505.0112-3] (L. King 15th ed. 1988) [hereinafter
COLLIER].
26 1966 Bankruptcy Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-496, 80 Stat. 270 (1966) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
27

Id.

11 3 COLLIER, supra note 25, at 505.0117].
11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra note 2 for text of the
statute. The new bankruptcy code of 1978 was known as the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
10 See 3 COLLIER, supra note 25, at 505.04[22-23].

3111 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1).
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II.

A.

JURISDICTION OVER TImD PARTIES

Legislative Intent: 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1)

The courts have consistently referred to the legislative intent
of 11 U.S.C. section 505 for guidance as to the proper interpretation of this section in relation to third parties. The Senate and
House comments to section 505 authorized the bankruptcy court
' 32
to rule on the tax claims of "the debtor or the estate."
3
3
However, the court in In re Major Dynamics, Inc. pointed
out that there is no indication that Congress ever considered
applying section 505 to third parties. 34 Therefore, Major Dynamics concluded that the language of the statute itself should be
consulted.15 Relying on Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill,3 6 the
bankruptcy court found that because the language is plain and
unambiguous on its face, it is not necessary to look to the
legislative history as a guide. Therefore, the court concluded that
it may determine the amount of any tax, including an IRS
assessment against a third party 37
Conversely, the court in In re Interstate Motor Freight
System 38 found that, "taken at face value, without recourse to
the legislative history, § 505 makes the Bankruptcy Courts a

11124

CONG. REc. S17,427 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); 124 CONG. REc. Hli,I10-11

(daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978). The relevant language of the House and Senate debate states
that "[t]he House amendment authorizes the bankruptcy court to rule on the merits of
any tax claim involving an unpaid tax, fine, or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition
to a tax, of the debtor or the estate." App. 3 COLLIER, supra note 25, at X-54 to X-55.
,3 14 B.R. 969 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
14 Id. at 971.
15Id. at 972 (the court concluded that they should look to the plain meaning of
the words, but noted that there were instances when this would defeat a regulatory
scheme).
- 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The Court stated that "[w]hen confronted with a statute
which is plain and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative
history as a guide to its meaning." Id. at 184 n.29 (quoting Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S.
55, 61 (1949)). But see Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S.
1, 23-24 (1976) (The court must look at the legislative history if reliance on the plain
language of a statute would result in "a significant alteration of the pervasive regulatory
scheme.").
Major Dynamics, 14 B.R. at 972.
35 62 B.R. 805, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986).
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second tax court system, empowering the Bankruptcy Court to
consider 'any' tax whatsoever, on whomsoever imposed." 3 9 The
court concluded that Congress did not intend this result and that
reliance on the language alone "would result in a significant
alteration of the pervasive regulatory scheme of which the statute
is a part." ' 40 Thus, the court held that there must be implicit
limits as evidenced in the legislative historg9l of section 505.42
The legislative comments do not indicate that Congress even
considered applying section 505 to third parties. As a result, one
cannot conclude whether Congress would or would not allow
the bankruptcy court to determine third party tax liability
Therefore, disputes among the courts have resulted, and the split
is unlikely to be resolved.
B.

The Scope of the Bankruptcy Court's General Jurisdiction:
28 U.S.C. § 1471

As additional support for broad interpretation of section
505, the courts have consulted the statutory definitions of the
scope of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Prior to 1984, the
courts consulted 28 U.S.C. section 1471, which provided for
original junsdiction "of all civil proceedings arising under title
11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.' 4 1 Relying on
the language of former section 1471, the court in In re H & R
Ice Co., Inc.44 reasoned that because the corporate officer's
liability under 26 U.S.C. section 667245 arises from failure to
pay the taxes of the debtor, his tax liability is related to a case
arising under Title 11.46 Therefore, as defined by section 1471,
the court found that it had general jurisdiction. 47
11Id. at 809.
Id. (quoting Major Dynamics, 14 B.R. at 972); see supra note 35.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
2 See Interstate, 62 B.R. at 809.
28 U.S.C. § 1471, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). This statute was
held invalid by the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
" 24 B.R. 28 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982).
26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
H & R Ice Co., Inc., 24 B.R. at 30.
7 Id. (More specifically, Judge Pelofsky found that the bankruptcy court had §
505(a)(1) jurisdiction to determine the legality of the assessment.)
40
4l

41

45

46
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The Supreme Court held in Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v Marathon Pipe Line, Co.4 8 that section 1471 was unconstitutional. Congress responded by enacting the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.49 The 1984
Amendments created 28 U.S.C. section 133450 and 28 U.S.C.
section 157-1 as the new jurisdictional statutes for the bankruptcy
court.
Although section 1334 uses the identical "arising under"
language of former section 1471, sections 157(b)(1) 5 2 and

1- 458 U.S. 50 (1982). See infra note 49.
,1The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). The 1984 Amendments were the legislative response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co., 458 U.S. 50 that the
grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court in § 1471 was unconstitutional and that
the jurisdiction given to the bankruptcy court was too broad for a non-Article III court.
King, Jurisdictionand Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND.
L. REv. 675, 676 (1985).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The relevant language of § 1334(b)
states that "the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all
civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11."
Bankruptcy judges constitute a "unit of the district court" in each judicial district. 28
U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. IV 1986).
51 28 U.S.C. at § 157. Section 157(a) provides: "Each district court may provide
that any or all proceedings under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11
shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district." For additional language of
§ 157, see infra notes 52-53.
52 Section 157(b)(1) provides in part that "[b]ankruptcy judges may hear and
determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in a case under title ll." Section 157(b)(2)(A)-(O) provides that:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the
purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but
not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal
injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of
distribution in a case under title 11;
(C)counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the
estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
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(c)(1) 53 introduce a dichotomy of core and noncore proceedings.5 4
This distinction is sigmficant in defining the ultimate power and

jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court." Section 157(b)(1) authorizes the bankruptcy judges to enter final orders in core proceed-

ings. 5 6 In noncore proceedings, 157(c)(1) requires that the
bankruptcy judge "submit proposed findings of fact and con-

clusions of law to the district court. ' 57 Thus, in a noncore
proceeding, the bankruptcy judge may not enter a final order
but must submit his findings to the district court, which then
enters the final order

In Campbell Enterprises, Inc. v United States, s the court
considered the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over a corporate
officer's section 6672 tax penalty based on section 1334 and

section 157 59 Pursuant to the "arising under" language of section 1334,60 the court found that it retained jurisdiction over a
proceeding involving a corporate officer's section 6672 tax liability 61 Additionally, under the broad defimtion of "core pro-

(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of
cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting
from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed
claims against the estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate
or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)-(O) (Supp. IV 1986).
s1 Section 157(c)(1) states in relevant part that "[a] bankruptcy judge may hear a
proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under
title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the district court." 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (Supp. IV
1986).
. See King, supra note 49, at 679.
s

Id.

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
11 66 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
11Id. at 203.
60 See supra note 50 for text of statute.
61 Campbell, 66 B.R. at 203. The court held, "[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and
§ 157,
this court clearly retains subject matter junsdiction over the instant proceeding." Id.
56
3

1988-891

BANKRUPTCY AND TAx LIABILITY

ceedings" in 157(b)(2)(A) and (O),62 the court concluded that
the proceeding could be heard by the bankruptcy judge, and a
final judgment could be entered. 63
This ruling indicates that courts may interpret the jurisdictional provisions of sections 1334 and 157 as broadly as they
had previously interpreted section 1471. The impact of this interpretation is that almost anything may qualify as a core proceeding, even a proceeding involving a third party 64
Effect on Reorganization: 26 U.S.C. § 6672

C.

65
The court in In re the Original Wild West Foods, Inc.
found that the "dispute over the collection of taxes assessed as
a penalty against [a corporate officer] is of primary importance
to this Court as it effects [sic] both the debtor corporation and
this Court's ability to administer effectively the reorganization
of the debtor corporation." 66 Therefore, the court concluded
that it had jurisdiction over the corporate officer's tax penalty 67
As with most issues concerning the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over third parties, the courts are split over the significance
of a 26 U.S.C. section 6672 penalty in corporate reorganiza6
tion. 1
The individual corporate officer's liability under section 6672
is "distinct from and in addition to the employer's liability for

6 Clauses A through 0
of § 157(b)(2) present matters that constitute a core
proceeding. The Campbell court found that the proceeding qualified under either (A),
which includes "matters concerning the administration of the estate" or (0), which
includes "proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship." Campbell, 66
B.R. at 203.
Lawrence King argues that § 157(b)(2) contains at least four catch-all phrases and
almost anything could be included under clauses (A) and (0). See King, supra note 49,
at 687-88. Therefore, he concludes that, "[tihese clauses alone appear to give the
bankruptcy courts all the pervasive junsdiction formerly granted by section 1471(b) and
(c)." Id. at 688 (citation omitted).
61 Campbell, 66 B.R. at 203. "Furthermore, under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(6), bankruptcy judges may hear and determine 'all core proceedings
'The matter presently
before this court is a 'core' proceeding." Id.
6, See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
45 B.R. 202 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984).
6Id.
at 206.
67

Id. at 206-07.

6

See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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these taxes.' 69 The debtors argue that despite the "distinct"
nature of section 6672, the court has jurisdiction to determine
the corporate officer's tax liability because it affects the debtor
corporation's reorganization efforts7" by depleting its key people
of both the time and the money needed for implementation of
the reorganization plan. 71 Because of this adverse effect, the
debtors argue that the corporate officer's section 6672 liability
is related to a case under Title 11.72
In response to the above argument, the court in Booth Tow
Services, Inc. v Spector73 stated that, "whether the penalty if
assessed will in fact injure the debtor is irrelevant. ' 74 The court
concluded that because the officer's section 6672 penalty is distinct from the debtor's liability, the section 6672 penalty should
be determined in a separate proceeding. 75 The Booth court reasoned that it is contradictory to call the corporate officer's
section 6672 liability distinct from the corporation's liability if
an adverse impact on the debtor's reorganization is enough to
sustain subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. 76 The
court went on to say, "[t]he Government's alternative remedies
for recovenng revenues that it is owed would then not be inde77
pendent of each other but would rather be essentially linked."
Contrary to the Booth opinion, the court in In re Major
Dynamics, Inc.7 found that the effect of the third party corporate officer's tax dispute on the reorganization of the debtor
corporation was significant. The court held that it could exercise
jurisdiction over third parties, "provided however, that the IRS
activity to be enjoined directly affected the debtor or the estate,
and that the exercise of such jurisdiction was necessary to the

Booth Tow Services, Inc. v. Spector, 53 B.R. 1014, 1017 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1985) (quoting Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 733 (5th Cir. 1983)).
70 See Campbell, 66 B.R. at 204.
69

In re 0. H. Lewis Co., 40 B.R. 531, 533 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1984).
See supra notes 43, 50 and accompanying text.
71 53 B.R. 1014 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985).
74 Id. at 1018 (quoting United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 46 B.R. 741, 744
(Bankr. W.D. Ga. 1985)).
7'

72

5 Id.
76
7

78

Id.
Id.
14 B.R. 969.
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rehabilitation of the debtor or the orderly and efficient admin'79
istration of the debtor's estate."
Thus, the significance the court gives to the adverse effects
of a section 6672 penalty on corporate reorganization becomes
a substantial factor in determlning whether the court will exercise
jurisdiction. If a court determines that the corporate officer's
section 6672 tax liability is absolutely separate and distinct from
the debtor corporation's Chapter 11 proceeding, then each must
be adjudicated separately Conversely, if a court acknowledges
the distinct nature of the penalty but adds that the penalty
adversely affects the debtor's reorganization, the bankruptcy
court may exercise jurisdiction over the penalty The effect of
the section 6672 penalty on the debtor's reorganization is also
an important factor in the analysis of the anti-injunction statute. 0
D

Effects of the Anti-Injunction Statute on Jurisdiction: 26
U.S.C. § 7421

Because the majority of cases that involve a section 6672
penalty against a corporate officer are seeking injunctive relief,
the anti-injunction statute's8 ' effect on the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction is significant. Section 7421 of Title 26 provides that,
"no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax
was assessed." ' 82 The purpose of this statute is "the protection
of the Government's need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a mimmum of pre-enforcement judicial

interference.'

'83

The issue, however, is the jurisdictional standard, not the
test for whether an injunction should be issued based on a

Id. at 972 (emphasis in original).
0 See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
11 In this Comment, the term "anti-injunction"
71

statute refers to 26 U.S.C. §

7421(a).
82Id.
11 Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974). (The petitioners
sought injunctive relief from an IRS decision to deny tax-exempt status to the petitioners'
religious school. The court held that the terms of § 7421 could only be avoided if there

is irreparable injury and certainty of success on the ments.).
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particular fact situation.8 4 Thus, the question before the courts
is whether the bankruptcy court has the power to issue an
injunction to restrain the IRS from collecting a section 6672 tax
penalty against a corporate officer despite section 7421. Section
105(a) of Title 1185 permits the bankruptcy judge to "issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title. ' 8 6 Thus, section 105 gives
the bankruptcy court enforcement powers, which may include
the ability to issue injunctions against the IRS. The conflict
between section 105 and section 7421 requires the court to make
a policy choice between the government's need to collect taxes
and the orderly administration of the Bankruptcy Act. This
87
conflict has created a split among the circuits.
In Bostwick v United States,8 the Umted States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the anti-injunction
statute was not relevant because Congress showed an intent to
enact a complete scheme governing bankruptcy that overrides
the general policy of section 7421.119 The court concluded that
since the overriding policy of the Bankruptcy Act is the rehabilitation of the debtor, the bankruptcy court must have the power
to "enjoin the assessment and/or collection of taxes in order to
protect its jurisdiction, administer the bankrupt's estate in an
orderly and efficient manner and fulfill the ultimate policy of
the Bankruptcy Act." 9
In contrast to Bostwick, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held in In re Becker's Motor Transporta-

1021 (Bankr.
14 See Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust, 25 B.R. 1018,
D.N.M. 1982) (The court considered whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to

enjoin a bank from proceeding in state court against a debtor corporation's officer who
was guarantor on a loan for the company. The court found that the bankruptcy court
had jurisdiction and an injunction was appropriate based on the facts.).
85 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
86 Id.

Jon Co., Inc. v. United States, 30 B.R. 831, 834 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). (The
court adopted the reasoning used in Bostwick v. United States, 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir.
1975) that Congress intended to enact a complete scheme governing bankruptcy that
overrides the general policy of section 7421.).
- 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1975). (Bostwzck did not involve a third party issue. The
issue before the court was whether the bankruptcy court could enjoin the IRS from
collecting a tax until the court determined the dischargeability of the tax debt.).
s9 Id. at 744.
go Id.
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tion, Inc.9i that no matter how persuasive the argument might
be against application of section 7421 in bankruptcy proceedings,
a judicial exemption for the bankruptcy court would contravene
congressional intent.92 Additionally, the Becker court argued
that had Congress intended to authorize the bankruptcy court
to issue injunctions, it would have included a grant of such
power in the 1966 Amendments to 26 U.S.C. section 7421(a). 93
The court concluded that these arguments should be addressed
to Congress, not the judiciary 94
Although the Becker court concluded that the controversy
concermng the interpretation of 11 U.S.C. section 505 can 9 only
6
95
be resolved by Congress, other solutions may be possible.
III.
A.

PossIBLE SOLUTIONS

Corporate Officers in Their Own Title 11 Proceeding

In re 0 H. Lewis Co. 97 suggested that the availability of an
alternate remedy at law would eliminate the need for a section
105 injunction, 98 which frustrates the strong tax policies underlying the penalty tax. 99 The court suggested that the corporate
officers could file their own bankruptcy proceeding and thus
receive the protection of the bankruptcy laws.10° Tus alternative
would accommodate the policies of both section 105 and section
6672, without trampling the important concerns of either 101
However, this remedy falls to take into consideration the repercussions to the corporate officer's credit standing resulting from

91In re Becker's Motor Transp., Inc., 632 F.2d 242 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 916 (1981). (The court in Becker considered generally whether the bankruptcy
court could enjoin the IRS from collecting a tax debt or penalty.).
92 Id. at 246.
93Id.
94 Id.

1 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
96See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
7 40 B.R. 531 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1984).
98 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
" 0. H. Lewis Co., 40 B.R. at 533.
10 Id.
101

Id.
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bankruptcy Moreover, this solution would have an adverse impact on the debtor's reorganization by diverting the corporate
officer's attention to his own bankruptcy proceeding.' 02
B.

Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction

The policies that form the foundation of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction may justify application of these grants of expanded jurisdiction to third party nondebtors in bankruptcy
proceedings. The exercise of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
expands the limited subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts in order to avoid piecemeal litigation of related disputes' 3
and facilitate judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to
litigants.I°4 These judicial policies are related to the present controversy because the debtor corporation is seeking to have its
own liability and its key officer's liability considered simultaneously in order to implement reorganization effectively
Both ancillary and pendent jurisdiction allow a federal court
to adjudicate a claim that is closely related to an action properly
within the court's statutory jurisdiction, but that by itself does
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements.10 5 The test for determimng whether a claim is closely related to an action before the
court was set forth in United Mine Workers of America v
Gibbs.1° The Court held that to exercise pendent jurisdiction:
[t]he state and federal claims must derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to
their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such
that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal
issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.'0 7
Applying this standard to the bankruptcy cases, the corporate
officer's tax liability and the liability of the debtor certainly arise

o See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CWIL PROCEDURE 66 (1985) [hereinafter

103

J. FRIEDENTHAL].
I" See United Mine
105 J. FRIEDENTHAL,

Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
supra note 103, at 67.

1- 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
107 Id. at 725. Although Gibbs involves a pendent action, the same test applies to
ancillary jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
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from a "common nucleus of operative fact,"'' 0 8 because the
corporate debtor's failure to pay the withholding taxes imposes
liability on the corporate officer under section 6672.109
Because bankruptcy cases involve many of the same policy
concerns addressed by ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, the
bankruptcy court's use of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction may
be a viable means of conferring jurisdiction over third party
proceedings.
C.

Protective Jurisdiction

Protective jurisdiction is a way for federal courts to fashion
a body of federal common law in areas in which Congress has
already enacted a general regulatory scheme.110 Textile Workers
Union of America v Lincoln Mills of Alabama' explored the
concept of protective jurisdiction in the context of collective
bargaining agreements and section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act." 2 Attempting to interpret section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, the Court found that Congress had developed a statutory scheme that demonstrated a
strong federal interest in industrial peace and an intent to have
collective bargaining agreements enforced in federal courts."'
The Court concluded that federal law, which courts must fashion
from the policy of the national labor laws, should be applied to
enforce collective bargaining agreements.1 4 This conclusion was
found to have constitutional support in article III, section 2,115
which extends judicial power to cases arising under the laws of

101Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
M 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra note 11. See also Treas.
Reg. § 301.6672-1 (1957): "The penalty imposed by Section 6672 applies only to the
collection, accounting for, or payment over of taxes imposed on a person other than
the [corporation] who is required to collect, account for, and pay over such taxes." Id.
HO See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448
(1957) (The issue before the court concerned the collective bargaining agreements that
Congress regulated under the Labor Relations Act.).
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
"2 Id.
The Labor Management Relations Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1973).
"' Id.
at 454 krelying on S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947)).
114Id. at 456.
..
' U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. (The judicial power extended to all cases "arising
under
the Laws of the United States.")
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the United States.11 6 Thus, as held by the Court in Lincoln Mills,
a case arising under the Labor Relations Act is within the judicial
power of the federal courts.
As in the area of labor relations in the Lincoln Mills case,
Congress has evidenced an intent to exercise broad powers in
the area of bankruptcy and has enunciated a strong policy interest in the protection of the debtor." 7 Therefore, m cases where
the debtor corporation seeks protection of its key personnel from
a section 6672 penalty, the concept of protective jurisdiction
should allow the federal courts to determine the third party
corporate officer's tax liability in accordance with the policy of
the bankruptcy laws.
Although the courts have not dealt with protective jurisdiction with regard to a section 6672 penalty, Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting in Lincoln Mills, pointed out that, "the bankruptcy
decisions may be justified by the scope of the bankruptcy power,
which may be deemed to sweep within its scope interests analytically outside the 'federal question' category, but sufficiently
related to the main purpose of bankruptcy to call for comprehensive treatment.""18 Therefore, there may be a strong argument for application of protective jurisdiction to bankruptcy
cases, and a section 6672 penalty against a corporate officer
may be sufficiently related to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding to call for comprehensive treatment through protective junsdiction.
CONCLUSION

Application of section 505(a)(1) jurisdiction" 9 to third parties
should not be so broadly construed as to create a "second tax

Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457
See In re Major Dynamics, Inc., 14 B.R. 969, 972 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
118Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 483 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The bankruptcy
cases that Justice Frankfurter is referring to do not involve the explicit issue of protective
junsdiction. In Schumacher v. Baler, 293 U.S. 367 (1934), the issue before the Court
was whether the district court had jurisdiction over a suit brought by a trustee in
bankruptcy to enjoin the sale of certain property. This consideration of the jurisdictional
ability of the court to determine these bankruptcy-related matters brings it within Justice
Frankfurter's protective jurisdiction analysis.
119 11U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
1,6

117
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court,"' 2 nor should it be so narrowly construed 2' as to defeat

the policy and purpose of the bankruptcy court. Pragmatically,
there must be a middle ground.
Reading section 505(a)(1) in conjunction with the jurisdictional grants of 28 U.S.C. section 1334 and 28 U.S.C. section
157,"2 Congress has consistently given broad grants of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts. Additionally, the consistent use
of "arising under" and "related to" language suggests an intent
to authorize a broad grant of jurisdiction. 23 Therefore, it seems
that the question should not be whether the bankruptcy court
has jurisdiction, but more appropriately, whether jurisdiction
should be exercised.
Because the overriding policy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
is the rehabilitation of the debtor,'2 a denial of jurisdiction in
the case of a section 6672121 penalty, which could seriously affect
the reorganization efforts of the debtor, would be unreasonable.
The resources of a debtor corporation's key officers are essential
in most instances for a successful reorganization effort. However, each fact situation should be evaluated to determine if
there is, in fact, an adverse effect on reorganization.126 The court
in In re Major Dynamics, Inc. stated the solution most effectively when it concluded that the bankruptcy court may extend
its jurisdiction to tax disputes of third parties, "provided, however,
that the exercise of such jurisdiction was necessary to
the rehabilitation of the debtor or the orderly and efficient
administration of the debtor's estate."' 127
Karen Skeens

'

In re Interstate Motor Freight Sys., 62 B.R. 805, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986).
supra note 5 and accompanying text.

121 See
"1
"'

See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457

(1957).
125

See In re Major Dynamics, Inc., 14 B.R. 969, 972 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra note 11 for text of the

statute.
l
12

Major Dynamics, Inc., 14 B.R. 969.
Id. at 972 (emphasis in onginal).

